

MORAL REGULATION OF WATER POLLUTION IN FINLAND FROM THE 1960s TILL 2000

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MORAL REGULATION

- Corrigan & Sayer 1985; Ruonavaara 1997; Hunt 2003; Törrönen 2004
- MORAL JUDGMENTS ON ACCEPTED OR UNACCEPTED POLLUTION

What were the characteristics of moral regulation of water pollution?

Who regulated?

How?

Whose interests were promoted?

DATA

- Water Economy Journal, articles from 1960 till 2000
- Interviews with environmental authorities
- Court documents concerning water pollution crimes

RESEARCH STRATEGIES

- Subjectivist strategy (Schütz, 1962)
- Substantialist strategy (Marxist tradition)
- Dialectical materialism (Harvey 1996)

MORAL REGULATION (analysis of WE journal)

1960s	Economic imperative	Utility ethos	Moral persuasions to get acceptance to minimal control
1970s	Technological and economic Imperative	Technological optimism ethos	Depolitization of social control through technology
1980s	Environmental imperative Vs. Technological imperative	Environmental ethos <small>(possibility to reconcile it with different values)</small>	Politization of Social control based on technological understanding of water protection
1990s	Deepening of Technologization	Task completed ethos	Justification of traditional control

Paradoxes of moral regulation

- 1960s condition of waterways deteriorated despite reforms favorable to regulation
- 1970s social control of pollution depolitized
- 1980s environmentalism was subordinated to utility values
- 1990s task completed ethos based on narrow understanding of social control

Control authorities' conceptions of social control

DOMESTIC (cf. Boltanski & Thévenot 1991)	INDUSTRIAL (cf. Boltanski & Thévenot 1991)
Control based on	Control based on
TRUST	CONTROLLED INDUSTRY'S SELF-REGULATION
SKILLS	EXPERTISE
DISCRETION	TECHNOLOGICAL IMPERATIVE
TRADITION AND CEREMONIES	CORRECTIVE MEASURES
SYMBOLIC	-

WEAKNESSES AND PARADOXES (based on analysis of whole data)

MORAL REGULATION AS CONCEPTS	CHARACTERIZATION	WEAKNESSES AND PARADOXES	IMPERATIVE
CORPORATE POWER	MAJORITY OF CONTROL INFORMATION DERIVES FROM CORPORATE'S SELF-REGULATION	CORPORATES' POWER TO RETAIN AND MANIPULATE INFORMATION	CONTROL AUTHORITIES' SCARCE FINANCIAL RESOURCES => ASYMMETRY
TECHNOLOGICAL IMPERATIVE	TECHNOLOGY AS LEADING PRINCIPLE OF SOCIAL CONTROL	DEPOLITIZATION OF SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH TECHNOLOGY SLENDER TRAPPINGS OF DEVIANCE	TECHNOLOGY AS A SYSTEM (cf. Eliul, 1980)
TRUST NORM	CONTROL AUTHORITIES' CONTROL WORK BASED ON 1) PERSONAL ACQUAINTANCE WITH THE CONTROLLED AND 2) TRUST ON BIG COMPANIES	SUSCEPTIBLE TO MISUSE OF TRUST	CONTROL AUTHORITIES' SCARCE FINANCIAL RESOURCES => CONSTRAINED TRUST
BLURRED BORDERS OF FORBIDDEN AND ALLOWED POLLUTION	CRIME CASES SHOW CONTROL AUTHORITIES' VARIETY OF INTERPRETATIONS OF COMPLIANCE	SOCIAL CONTROL AS CONTINGENT	

Who regulated?

- State authorities who dealt with water issues
- Wood industry as the biggest exporter of goods was a relevant actor in social control in the 1960s also in the 1970s
- Corporatist governance i.e. committees (1960s and 1970s)
- Environmental movements (1980s)
- Engineers (control authorities and industry's representatives who were in charge process and purification technology had technical education => mutual understanding about means of control)

Criticism of Hunt's definition of moral regulation

- Moral regulation based on what is right as an ethical judgment (Hunt 2003, 364).

II

V

- In this paper moral regulation was based on what is right as expediency (& interests)

Demand for broader concept of moral regulation

- Means and targets of moral regulation are formed in a process in which moral claims are in minor position
- Moral claims seek for support from science, politics, and technology => requires broader understanding of moral regulation